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Ninety Years of United States-Hungarian Relations1 
Tibor Glant 
Introductory remarks 
There is something wrong with American-Hungarian relations 
today. Few countries in the world are more important for Hungary than 
the United States of America; and still, most anniversaries of our rich 
common history continue to pass unnoticed and the language of public 
diplomacy on both sides leaves a lot to be desired. Symbolic gestures 
abound from President Bush’s visit to Hungary in 2006 to commemorate 
the 50
th
 anniversary of the 1956 Revolution to the unveiling of a Reagan 
statue in Budapest last year. At the same time, Trianon at 90 was 
commemorated without mention of the United States, and the first ever 
exchange of ministers between the two countries in 1922 has largely 
escaped attention so far in 2012. There is no talk of the 150
th
 anniversary 
of the American Civil War or the bicentennial of the War of 1812 in 
Hungary. In this paper I will explain major trends in 90 years of official 
United States-Hungarian relations and speculate about the causes of this 
selective neglect. 
Prewar diplomatic interludes 
Although diplomatic relations were established between the United 
States and Hungary only after World War I, various diplomatic interludes 
had taken place before. The 1848–49 Hungarian revolution and War of 
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Independence was the first such occasion. In December 1848 Kossuth 
approached the American minister to Vienna, William H. Stiles, to 
mediate between Hungary and Austria, but the initiative was met with all-
out Austrian rejection. Kossuth then decided to send an official 
diplomatic representative to Washington, but Ede Damburghy arrived at 
his post only after the Hungarians had surrendered and was not allowed to 
present his credentials. Meanwhile, the State Department sent Dudley A. 
Mann to Europe on a secret mission to grant diplomatic recognition for 
independent Hungary if he saw fit. He did not, but after his return his 
correspondence with the State Department was published officially. The 
Austrian diplomatic representative in Washington, Johann von 
Hülsemann, sent an impolite letter to Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
and explained that if Mann’s mission had been discovered, he would have 
been executed as a traitor. Webster’s reply, generally known as the 
“Hülsemann letter,” postulated that Mann’s execution would have been 
treated as open aggression against the United States, and Washington 
would have retaliated by force.
2
 War of words, of course, but it 
established a key Hungarian myth: the US would stand by Hungarians in 
times of need. The popular reception granted to Kossuth in the New 
World (1851–52) and the Smyrna incident involving former Honvéd 
Army officer Márton Koszta (1853)3 all seemed to confirm this belief. 
The Revolution and Kossuth’s subsequent visit to the United States, in 
turn, helped establish a key American stereotype: Hungary being a 
country of freedom fighters.
4
 
Another, less known, but perhaps even more significant, diplomatic 
interlude took place between Count Albert Apponyi and President 
Theodore Roosevelt during the Hungarian constitutional crisis in the early 
                                                 
2
 Jenő Pivány, Magyar-amerikai történelmi kapcsolatok a Columbus előtti időktől az am
erikai polgárháború befejezéséig (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1926) 
and in English: Hungarian-American Historical Connections from the Pre-Columbian 
Times to the End of the Civil War (1927). 
3
 Andor Klay [Sziklay], Daring Diplomacy. The Case of the First American Ultimatum (
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957) and in Hungarian: Vakmerő diplom
ácia: amerikai ultimátum egy magyar szabadságharcosért (Budapest: Argumentum, 1
997). 
4
 Tibor Frank, “Az emberiségnek közös sorsa van: Kossuth az Egyesült Államokban, 18
51–52” Rubicon Vol. 6, Nos. 1–2 (1995), 42–44. Note that Debrecen Televízió is shoo
ting a two-part documentary on Kossuth’s trip. Part 1 will deal with the trip itself, whil
e Part 2 with its memory. 
165 
1900s. The two politicians first met in 1904 and became good friends. In 
1905-06, a political crisis emerged in Hungary, when the opposition 
(Apponyi among them) won the general elections and threatened not to 
renew the customs union between Vienna and Budapest. At that point 
Roosevelt intervened and argued eloquently for the survival of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with his Hungarian friend. He doubled his 
efforts through his ambassador to Vienna, Charles Spencer Francis, and 
advised his daughter, Alice, that if she and her husband were to travel to 
Vienna on their European honeymoon, they should also go to Budapest. 
The Roosevelt-Apponyi correspondence suggests that the American 
president had a calming effect on the Hungarian aristocrat, and the crisis 
was averted. The two politicians had an opportunity to discuss these 
events during Roosevelt’s much publicized visit to Hungary in 1910.5 
After World War I 
The United States of American entered the war in April 1917 and 
declared war on Austria-Hungary in December. Following the Frost-
flower Revolution in Budapest at the end of the Great War, Hungary 
restored her independence and full diplomatic relations with the United 
States became a possibility. As Hungary sank into civil war (1918–20), 
revolutionary leader Count Mihály Károlyi put all his faith in the 
American president, describing his policy as “Wilson, Wilson, and again 
Wilson.” As a result of half a dozen revolutions in key cities, the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy fell apart, as did the old Kingdom of Hungary, 
which had enjoyed special privileges within the realm of the Habsburgs 
since the Compromise of 1867. The war in the Carpathian Basin began in 
earnest after the Great War had ended, as the would-be successor states 
launched military campaigns, often with open allied (mostly French) 
support, to occupy territories before the Paris Peace Conference would 
finalize the new boundaries. The political chaos in Hungary was settled 
by British intervention (the Clerk mission in late 1919), Admiral Miklós 
Horthy took control, occupying Rumanian troops were withdrawn from 
the country, and the Hungarian peace treaty was signed. Trianon became 
a “second Mohács” for Hungarians, and the revision of the peace treaty 
                                                 
5
 Tibor Glant, “Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia” Századok Vol. 131, No. 6 
(1997), 1386–1401, and a short version in English: “American-Hungarian Relations, 1
900–1918” Hungarian Studies Review Vol. 32, Nos. 1–2 (2005), 1–14. 
166 
that moved over three million ethnic Hungarians to the successor states 
became a cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy in general and US-
Hungarian relations in particular.
6
  
In December 1919 Ulysses S. Grant-Smith, formerly working at the 
Vienna Embassy, returned to Hungary and assumed consular duties. He 
managed passports for people traveling both ways and protected 
American business interests in a volatile manner.
7
 So much so, that he 
was repeatedly reminded that he was not officially a consul, and, on one 
occasion, was asked by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to 
respond to accusations regarding his conduct: “Department informed you 
have REFUSED to GRANT VISAS to passengers not sailing steamers 
under American flag. Telegraph facts. HUGHES.”8 Grant-Smith’s 
eventful semi-official consular work came to an end in February 1922, 
when he was replaced by Charge d’Affaires Eugene C. Shoecraft until the 
newly appointed minister, Judge Theodore Brentano, could occupy his 
post in May of the same year.  
The resumption of de facto consular work by Grant-Smith marked 
the beginning of official bilateral relations more than two years before 
ministers were actually exchanged. In the two years he spent in Hungary 
in a diplomatically in-between position, he was responsible for settling 
three key issues: (1) negotiating a separate US-Hungarian peace treaty to 
terminate hostilities (signed in August 1921); (2) clarifying which prewar 
treaties would remain in effect, which would be terminated, and which 
would be renegotiated; and (3) clearing the new Hungarian minister to 
Washington (Count László Széchényi, December 1921). Grant-Smith did 
a solid job at his old-new post and expected to be named US Minister to 
Hungary, but diplomatic complaints and domestic political considerations 
(the incoming Republican administration had its own preferences for 
overseas posts) prompted President Warren G. Harding to name Brentano. 
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Still, Grant-Smith left an indelible mark on bilateral relations: his not 
necessarily unfounded impatience with the new Hungarian elite (especially 
corruption) and his open promotion of American business interests in 
postwar Hungary set the trend for two decades to come. He later served as 
American Minister to Albania (1922–25) and Uruguay (1925–29). 
Bilateral diplomatic relations meant political, economic, and 
cultural ties. Political contacts were defined by thinly veiled Hungarian 
expectations that the US should live up to “Wilsonian ideals,” while 
Americans refused, or did their best to refuse, to even discuss Trianon. 
Such unwelcome Hungarian attempts to force the hand of the White 
House included the publication of newspapers and magazines (The 
Commentator, The Hungarian Nation, Külföldi Magyarság, and Magyar 
Szemle, the latter in Hungarian, English, and French), the 1928 Kossuth 
Pilgrimage to unveil a new statue of the Hungarian revolutionary on 
Riverside Drive in North Manhattan, and the Justice for Hungary flight of 
1931.
9
  
With Hungarians industriously celebrating July 4
th
 in Budapest, 
diplomatic relations were cordial but remained uneventful. Still, the 
private and official correspondence of William R. Castle offers unique, 
and amusing, insights into the everyday life of the legation and into the 
private spheres of bilateral contacts. Castle was a career diplomat: he first 
served as Special Assistant to the State Department (1919–21), then as 
Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (where the Hungarian 
desk belonged, 1921–27), and later as Assistant Secretary of State (1927) 
and Under-Secretary of State (1931–33).10 His personal remarks on 
Grant-Smith and Brentano tell a story quite different from official 
diplomatic correspondence. A letter from May 1922, for example, 
indicates that the State Department “was annoyed at Grant-Smith’s action 
in instructing the Consul to give preference in visa matters to Americans 
sailing on American ships” and that the complaints came not from 
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Hungarians but from the British.
11
 Castle was unhappy with the 
performance of the Budapest Legation and asked Secretary Charles B. 
Curtis in a private letter to provide regular, weekly and monthly reports.
12
 
In another letter to Curtis, dated May 6, 1925, Castle complained about 
Brentano’s drinking habits and alleged romantic contacts “with some 
Jewish dancer from the opera.” His dislike of Brentano was on display 
again on November 11 of the same year, when he mockingly informed 
Charge d’Affaires ad interim George A. Gordon that Brentano “is not a 
bad old fellow, but if he were not your Chief, I should have to admit that I 
consider him an awful ass. As he is your Chief, I shall say nothing about 
him except that he is immensely enthusiastic about you.”13 Hungarians 
added their fair share of comic interludes to the 1920s: in the fall of 1927 
a California Hungarian, supposedly Archduke Leopold, insulted Minister 
Széchényi, and challenged him to a saber duel. It took some effort on the 
part of the State Department to convince the diplomat and the aristocrat 
that sword fighting was not considered an appropriate means of settling 
such debates.
14
 These stories show the light, relaxed side of official 
diplomatic affairs, and should be treated accordingly. The Castle papers 
are unique, because they reveal the uncensored private side of one of the 
key decision makers in the State Department during the “Republican 
1920s.” Brentano was replaced by Joshua Butler Wright in 1927, and in 
1931 a familiar face from the hectic days of 1919, Nicholas Roosevelt, 
returned in an official capacity. 
We know considerably less about economic contacts between the 
United States and Hungary, but the information available provides ample 
grounds for a basic outline. First and foremost, Herbert Hoover’s 
American Relief Administration provided food and medication for 
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refugees and children until 1923, thus saving thousands of lives.
15
 At the 
end of the war many American businessmen came to Hungary looking for 
new investment opportunities. According to the above cited consular 
records, shipping, government purchases of automobiles, and movie theater 
ownership were the main issues. Once the dust settled, Hungary seemed 
less inviting: hyperinflation, economic depression, refugees from the 
successor states, and political isolation added up to diminishing interest. 
Budapest asked for a League of Nations loan, and the international body 
responded by demanding financial stability first. To ensure this, an 
American financial supervisor, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., was dispatched to 
Hungary. Smith worked in Hungary between 1924 and 1926 and 
published monthly reports in the Wall Street Journal. In between, in 
1925, a bilateral trade, consular, and cultural agreement was signed, and 
the two countries agreed upon the first Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
agreement for ten years.
16
 It was repeatedly renewed until after World 
War II, when Hungary became a Soviet colony and any such cooperation 
with the United States was out of the question. The MFN agreement again 
opened up Hungary for American investment, for example in the oil 
industry. 
Personal and cultural ties also emerged between the wars. Counts 
Albert Apponyi and Pál Teleki continued to cultivate their prewar 
contacts and visited the New World during the early 1920s. Both worked 
in close cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, and its then president and later Nobel Peace Prize laureate, 
Nicholas Murray Butler, on evaluating the costs and consequences of the 
Great War.
17
 Some of the iconic members of the Károlyi revolution 
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settled in the United States. Most notable among them was Oscar Jászi, 
who wrote a seminal work titled The Dissolution of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in 1929. Academic exchanges began for both men and women, 
and Hungarians conducted lively discussions on American matters 
ranging from fauna to government and contemporary politics. As of 1927, 
Americans began to attend the Debrecen Summer School, a program that 
has contributed to the training of many a foreign diplomat in Hungary. 
The 1924 Reed-Johnson Immigration Restriction Act may have cut 
transatlantic migration off, but Hungarians continued to find their way 
into the United States, sometimes as above the quota admissions, 
sometimes even illegally, across the Canadian or Mexican borders.
18
 Still, 
the most spectacular development took place in the cultural interaction 
between the two countries. 
Hungarians have always been fascinated by film, and Hollywood 
became a dominant cultural force with strong Hungarian participation. 
Major movie icons like Dracula, Tarzan, or Mr. Moto were all played by 
actors born in Hungary, Michael Curtiz emerged as an all-important 
director, and Miklós Rózsa won three Oscars for his musical scores. 
Meanwhile, American film, music, and pulp fiction came to define the 
popular culture of interwar Hungary. Buffalo Bill, Nick Carter, Charlie 
Chan, and an infinite list of Western heroes shaped the cultural education 
of the first Trianon generation in Hungary. The golden age of Hungarian 
sound film (1930s) drew heavily upon the American experience.  
In World War II 
During the interwar years nothing suggested the diplomatic break 
that would come in 1941 or the fact that Americans would bomb major 
Hungarian cities in still another world war. Even as Hungary began to 
gravitate towards the newly emerging Nazi Germany, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s minister to Hungary, John F. Montgomery, continued to 
enjoy excellent personal relations with Hungarian head of state Governor 
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Horthy.
19
 Meanwhile, Minister László Széchényi moved on to London 
(1933) and was replaced by his former deputy, János Pelényi.20 When 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union attacked Poland from both sides and 
World War II began, the United States again declared her neutrality. The 
partial revision of the Treaty of Trianon took place, with German 
sponsorship, in the form of two Vienna Awards in 1938 and 1940. 
Hungary joined the German war against the Soviet Union in the summer 
of 1941, and it was a matter of time before she would find herself at war 
with the United States. In fact, Hungary declared war on the United States 
in December 1941, a dubious claim to fame and the lowest ever point in 
bilateral relations. 
Interestingly, World War II contributed to the positive image of 
Hungarians in the New World, through the efforts of Hungarian scientists 
(of Jewish stock) working for the Manhattan Project to develop the 
atomic bomb, then referred to as the “super weapon.” Ede Teller, Leó 
Szilárd, János Naumann, and Jenő Wigner were the key players, but 
Tódor Kármán also contributed. These people fled Hungary for Germany 
following the first European postwar anti-Semitic legislation, the 
Numerus Clausus Act of 1920. When Hitler rose to power, they moved to 
England, then on to the United States. They helped create the image of 
“clever Hungarians,” a supplement to the freedom fighter image.21 
Meanwhile, various wartime governments of Hungary participated in the 
Holocaust despite American warnings (including FDR’s proclamation of 
March 24, 1944), and many were executed as war criminals after the 
conflict had ended. Unlike in World War I, this time Hungary 
experienced war first-hand: western allies bombed many major cities, 
while the Soviet Union invaded her. The Soviet Army liberated Hungary 
from Nazi rule (including the puppet regime set up by Hitler under Ferenc 
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Szálasi on October 15, 1944), but plundered and raped her, and continued 
to occupy the country until the early 1990s. 
The Roosevelt administration weighed two options concerning the 
future of the Carpathian Basin: Habsburg restoration and spheres of 
influence. While the former was given serious consideration in the early 
phases of the war, it was the latter that materialized in the form of the 
“Four Policemen” idea in general and the Yalta agreements in particular. 
FDR agreed, in return for Moscow’s cooperation against Nazi Germany, 
to grant Stalin control over what they called a “buffer zone” along the 
western border of the territorially enlarged Soviet Union. From the Baltic 
States through Central Europe to parts of Yugoslavia and Germany, this 
was seen as a western sellout of the region, and Yalta became a bad word. 
Similarly to the territorial issues (Yalta), future economic and political 
cooperation (Bretton Woods agreements and the establishment of the 
United Nations) were also agreed upon before war’s end. VE-Day and 
VJ-Day simply terminated hostilities.
22
 Still, the United States did not 
escape the war unscathed: she became the first, and to the present day 
only country ever to deploy an atomic bomb, incidentally on the civilian 
populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Transition after World War II 
The two and a half to three years between the end of the European 
war and communist takeovers by force in the region are generally seen as 
a period of transition. In February 1945, in Yalta, an agreement was made 
that coalition governments would be set up following the war, but months 
before, in November 1944, the timetable and methods of a communist 
takeover had also been agreed upon between Hungarian and Soviet 
communists in Moscow. In the postwar world of great power spheres of 
influence being on the winning or losing side did not matter: 
Czechoslovakia became a Soviet colony just as Hungary did. To add 
insult to injury, a second Trianon peace treaty (February 1947) restored 
the pre-1938 borders and granted additional concessions to 
Czechoslovakia, in return for direct Soviet entrance into Hungary where 
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the Czechoslovak-Rumanian corridor once stood: in the southwestern tip 
of the Ukraine.
23
  
The immediate postwar period saw two distinct groups of 
Hungarians seek entrance into the United States: the 45-ers and the 47-
ers. The former were representatives of the interwar elite in Hungary: 
urban, upper-middle class professionals, mostly lawyers and soldiers. The 
latter represented the new elite of the coalition period: mostly 
Smallholders, who won election after election and seemed to provide the 
social-political backbone of postwar Hungary. It was under this 
Smallholder-led coalition that Hungary became a republic (1946) and 
negotiated the peace treaty. They were forced out of power by a thinly 
veiled, Soviet-sponsored coup in the summer of 1947. These two groups, 
collectively known as “dipik” (Displaced Persons, and as such, above the 
quota admissions), made up about 26,000 people. A third wave of 
refugees joined in 1956, numbering an estimated total of another 50,000 
people.
24
 
The United States found it increasingly difficult to handle the 
situation she herself had helped create with the Yalta deals. Attempts 
were made to secure cooperation on the part of various countries now 
under Soviet occupation, but these all failed. An invitation to join the 
Marshall Plan was rejected under Soviet duress, and the return of the gold 
and silver reserves of the Hungarian National Bank as well as the partial 
restitution of art treasures taken out of Hungary by the Nazis remained a 
unilateral gesture. On secret Hungarian insistence, Washington refused to 
return the Holy Crown of Hungary and the assorted coronation regalia 
delivered to the US Army in Austria by the Royal Hungarian Crown 
Guard in the dying days of the war. Hungarians felt betrayed by the West 
yet again, as Soviet control was becoming absolute and more open. This, 
in turn, led to the rise of anti-Americanism on a large scale for the first 
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time ever in Hungary. Communists fed off this sentiment and the two 
countries began to expel each other’s diplomats and businessmen. The 
Hungarian show trials (especially of Robert A. Vogeler and Cardinal 
Mindszenty) were followed with keen interest in the United States: by 
1949 the Cold War was on.
25
 
The Cold War 
The postwar transition was followed by three distinct phases in US-
Hungarian relations during the Cold War: hostility (1947–69), 
normalization (1969–78), and the gradual disintegration of Soviet control 
(1979–89).26 This period was as irrational as it could be, and saw both 
extremes: open confrontation with public hate speech during the 1950s as 
well as cordial relations in the 1980s, which made East-West conflicts 
seem redundant. 
In the period of open hostility, Washington spoke of “slave nations” 
and “red Fascism,” while Budapest promoted the concept of “fascist 
American geopolitics” and accused the White House of conspiracy 
against the Hungarian people. The two parties continued to expel 
diplomats and placed restrictions on the free movement of the remaining 
staffs. Hungary settled financial claims with all western powers except the 
United States, and Washington kept Budapest out of the United Nations 
until December 1955. Relations hit rock bottom as result of the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence. Hungarians believed 
American “liberation” and “roll-back” rhetoric and stood up to the 
Hungarian version of Stalinism. While the American public supported the 
Revolution, the White House had its doubts about Imre Nagy, who 
himself was a communist. Without permission, American-sponsored 
propaganda radios (Radio Free Europe and Voice of America) promised 
military support and urged Hungarians to fight. The November 4 Soviet 
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invasion, Operation Whirlwind, ended in bloodbath. 200,000 Hungarians 
fled the country, tens of thousands were tried for treason, and several 
hundred, among them children under 18, were executed. Cardinal 
Mindszenty emerged from house arrest in the country, gave a much 
publicized speech demanding the restoration of the prewar order (which 
only very few supported), and then sought refuge in the American 
Legation. Diplomatic relations were reduced to the lowest possible level: 
temporary charge d’affaires. 
It took ten years for the new Kádár regime to assert itself and win 
some international recognition. Kádár was admitted to the United States 
to attend a UN session as early as 1958. Partial amnesties (1961, 1962) 
were followed by a “general amnesty” in 1963 which still left hundreds of 
freedom fighters in jail. Following the reality check of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of October 1962, “bridge building” began between East and West. 
In 1964 Hungary signed an agreement with the Holy See, and in 1966 
US-Hungarian relations were raised from the lowest to the highest, 
ambassadorial, level. The Kádár regime sustained the myth of 1956 being 
a “CIA coup” to bring down the “democratic” government of Hungary, 
but toned down its rhetoric in English. This was partly due to the fact that 
the centrally controlled socialist economic system, which, against all 
common sense, superimposed political decisions over economic ones, 
turned out to be a disaster by 1968. Hungary needed western loans and 
was willing to change her tone to accommodate the spirit of détente 
created by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
27
 
In 1968 Hungary announced economic reforms which amounted to 
an attempt at squaring the circle: the plan was to introduce elements of 
free market economy into the centrally controlled system that was kept 
afloat by Soviet assistance, and which was under direct Soviet 
supervision. This resulted in a culture of cheating and lies: a population 
that needed to survive in spite of the economic incompetence its 
inefficient political leadership began to operate a booming black market 
economy. Hungary also negotiated a deal to join the IMF, but Moscow 
prevented the move. Still, in the West this was seen as a major departure 
by Budapest. Incoming United States President Richard M. Nixon 
embraced the idea of détente and the “normalization” of bilateral relations 
began. In the summer of 1969 Budapest and Washington identified four 
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issues to start with, including the potentially explosive matter of 
American pensioners in Hungary. Mindszenty left the Embassy in 1971, 
cultural exchanges were set up, financial claims were settled, and a 
consular agreement was hammered out. Kádár’s Hungary became one of 
the favorite sons of Washington in a policy that can best be described as 
“divide and rule:” the Nixon White House tested each East European 
communist country to see how far they were willing to go on bilateral 
issues and to what degree they were ready to defy Moscow. For different 
reasons, Poland (some 6 million immigrants in the US), Rumania 
(“independent” foreign policy with no Soviet army inside the country), 
and Hungary (“liberal” domestic policies, the “happiest barracks”) were 
favored over others. Hungary and Poland were invited to supervise the 
armistice in Vietnam (1973), and the Helsinki Accords (1975) seemed to 
have taken détente to its logical conclusion: if the Cold War is here to 
stay indefinitely, let us make it as cordial as possible. In 1978 the 
Coronation Regalia were returned to Hungary and a bilateral MFN 
agreement was signed against the expressed will of the Soviet Union. 
United States-Hungarian relations became as “normal” as possible 
between a Soviet colony and the leader of the Free World.
28
 
Two events in 1979 shook the very foundations of the bipolar world 
order: the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan and an Islamic Revolution 
gained control of, and took American hostages in, Iran, which, up to that 
point, had been a key ally for Washington in the Middle East. 
Interestingly, the coming of the “second cold war” between Washington 
and Moscow had a positive effect on US-Hungarian relations, although, 
for example, Hungary decided to join the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los 
Angeles Summer Olympic Games. Hungary now was allowed to join the 
IMF and the World Bank, and took out western loans. Items on the 
COCOM-list were still off limits, but American cultural diplomacy was 
stepped up. Budapest proved supportive, and the Soros Foundation 
(which promoted an “open society”) was granted permission to 
commence operations in Hungary. The diplomatic records of this period 
remain partly classified, but one is under the impression that by the early 
1970s Hungary had managed to develop a new guard to conduct foreign 
affairs: people who spoke good English and were willing and able to 
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engage in meaningful interaction: Gyula Horn, János Fekete, and János 
Nagy are among the names that come to mind. 
As of the early 1970s Hungary received loan after loan for 
structural reforms of the economy, but the money was spent on sustaining 
a high level of corruption and a standard of living which was not 
warranted by the performance of the economy. Economic incompetence 
navigated the country to the verge of bankruptcy again and again (1968, 
1981, 1989, and later in 1995 and 2008), but for the United States 
political concessions mattered more than economic common sense. In 
1989 the communist system collapsed, but it left behind an unmanageable 
economic crisis. Instead of a “new Marshall Plan,” western investors 
looked for cheap labor and new markets, which set Hungary (as well as 
the whole region) on the economic collision course she is still trying to 
get off of. The burial of Imre Nagy and his fellow revolutionaries on June 
16, 1989 was a moment to remember. The officially promoted but 
privately rejected anti-Americanism of the latter communist period 
evaporated in a matter of weeks, not least because of the televised public 
speech of President George Bush at the Karl Marx University of 
Economics. In 1989 everything seemed possible, and most Hungarians 
entertained a surrealistically positive image of the United States and high 
hopes of things to come. 
Since 1989 
The lands between Germany and Russia fell victim to Nazism first 
and then communism. Its peoples expected some genuine assistance from 
the West that repeatedly sold them out (Munich, 1938, Yalta, 1945, 
Trianon, 1947). The West, on the other hand, saw strategic possibilities 
and investment opportunities. The concept of an expanded European 
Community surfaced with promises of including the new democracies, 
and a Partnership for Peace program was launched to secure US military 
influence in the region. Hungary joined NATO in 1998, just in time to 
provide crucial air bases for the US bombing of Serbia as Yugoslavia was 
disintegrating in war. In fact, Hungarians demonstrated their desire to 
belong to the West in two referenda: on joining NATO (1997: 85% voting 
in favor) and the European Union (2003: 83% supporting).
29
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In the absence of reliable information, hindsight, and archival 
sources like the Castle papers discussed above, bilateral United States-
Hungarian relations since 1989 are not easy to evaluate,
30
 and the 
following discussion is based, in part. on personal impressions. On the 
surface, everything seems alright: the two countries are military allies for 
the first time, and Hungarians are fighting (and dying) in America’s war 
on terror. Cultural relations are blossoming, economic ties are strong, and 
many Hungarians are choosing the United States as a tourist or 
professional destination. Americans have long been able to travel to 
Hungary without a visa, and finally Hungarian tourists can also avoid the 
long lines outside the Embassy in the heart of Budapest. Hungary 
provided diplomatic and consular services for United States citizens in 
Syria earlier this year, when Washington withdrew diplomats from 
Damascus on February 6, 2012. The two countries may formally be allies, 
but under the surface tensions sometimes still overflow. These alarming 
signs deserve attention. 
For an informed Hungarian observer the two most disturbing 
elements are a clear political preference on the part of Washington for the 
former communist party and a marked turn in American cultural 
diplomacy. In the past 20 years the various American administrations, 
Republican and Democrat alike, have openly preferred the Hungarian 
Socialist Party over any other force in Hungarian politics. The fact that 
Washington prefers to deal with the very same people the White House 
has been dealing with since the 1970s
31
 only partly explains this trend. 
Another reason must be the fear of Trianon and/or the status of Hungarian 
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minorities in the neighboring countries being officially brought up under 
a more nationalist government.  
A case in point is the period between 2002 and 2010, when a 
socialist government got away with driving the country to the verge of 
bankruptcy and faking economic data for both the Hungarian Parliament 
and the EU between 2005 and 2008, and thus wistfully misleading 
American businessmen in Hungary. The same administration appointed a 
KGB-trained senior officer, Sándor Laborc, as head of Hungarian national 
intelligence, thus risking sensitive NATO information.
32
 Major human 
rights violations were committed by masked policemen without clearly 
visible identification on the 50
th
 anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, and 
an opposition MP was beaten unconscious and had to be hospitalized. 
Although Prime Minster Gyurcsány’s “Öszöd speech” displayed a major 
deficit in democratic principles,
33
 his party still kept him in power for 
years; but no public American protests came on any of the above 
accounts. By 2010 most Hungarians agreed that the compromise of 1989 
had failed and a total makeover was needed. The newly elected FIDESZ 
government received unprecedented mandate for change (68% of the 
seats in a single-chamber legislature) from the Hungarian people but 
barely receives the benefit of the doubt from Washington, although in the 
American system of elections there would be one single opposition MP 
out of the 386. Absurd accusations fly of a possible return to the fascist 
era of the 1930s and of the dismantling of democratic institutions, while 
American diplomatic correspondence is regularly leaked to Népszabad-
ság, originally established in 1942 as Szabad Nép, the official organ of 
the communist party and a living reminder of the communist dictatorship 
that many of us fought against.
34
 Most Hungarians find what they 
                                                 
32
 “Nem mindneki tudott Laborc életrajzának pikáns részleteiről” on the Index news 
portal, dated February 7, 2008: http://index.hu/kulfold/laborc9466/ (accessed: March 
23, 2012). I have not been able to find any article raising this issue in the American 
press at the time. He is now under criminal investigation in Hungary for entrusting a 
supposedly Bulgarian (but probably Russian) security firm to review the security 
clearance of people working in Hungarian national intelligence. 
33
 Although the full speech is not available in English, the partial BBC translation tells 
the whole story: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm (accessed: March 23, 
2012). 
34
 http://nol.hu/kulfold/hillary_clinton_levele_orban_viktornak_-_itt_a_teljes_szoveg 
(accessed: March 23, 2012). The page has the original in pdf. Much of the criticism is 
based on the arguments of the “independent” think-tank, Haza és Haladás, which is 
180 
consider double standards disturbing, and the 80% support for NATO and 
EU membership is slowly eroding. On January 21, 2012, a Woodstock-
size crowd gathered in the Hungarian capital for a “March for Peace” to 
support the current administration: one key issue they raised was 
Secretary of State Clinton’s letter, in which she lectured the government 
of Hungary on democracy and raised such particular domestic issues that 
could only be brought up by the practically nonexistent, and politically 
badly discredited, domestic opposition.
35
 The unconditional admiration 
most Hungarians felt for the United States in 1989 is vanishing. 
American cultural diplomacy has also gone through major changes 
since the 1980s. Back then, American diplomats knew all American 
Studies professionals, and traveled extensively in the country.
36
 The 
Hungarian Fulbright Commission was set up in 1992. Academic 
exchanges are flourishing, just like they did between the wars. However, 
during the Clinton years United States Information Agency and Service 
(USIA and USIS) were closed down and its libraries were given away to 
universities and research institutions. The establishment of American 
Corners in various cities around Hungary was a new and welcome 
initiative to restart cultural diplomacy in 2004-2006. In the 1990s the US 
helped fund Hungarian citizens studying at the Salzburg Seminar and 
American ambassadors opened American Studies conferences in person. 
In 1997 I worked in close cooperation with the Embassy not only on 
putting out a book on the return of the Holy Crown of Hungary but also 
on the anniversary celebrations, which were honored by Ambassador 
Peter Tufo within two weeks of his arrival. In contrast, a December 14, 
2007 cable released by wikileaks proves that the then ambassador 
identified me, much to my surprise, as a “conservative political science 
professor” and not as the head of one of the very few American Studies 
departments in Hungary.
37
 No ambassador has lent her personal support 
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to any of the last four biennial conferences of the Hungarian Association 
of American Studies, which would be unthinkable in Austria or Germany. 
American preferences have understandably changed after the 9-11 
terrorist attacks, but the traditional anti-American sentiment still so 
prevalent in Hungarian academic circles and rising anti-Americanism in 
the general population threaten the very existence of genuine discussion 
of American culture as well as the survival of American Studies in 
Hungary. Work needs to be done on the high school and university 
curricula, all the way down to language teaching, since symbolic gestures 
like the restoration of the Bandholtz statue to Szabadság tér38 or President 
Bush’s visit to Hungary on the 50th anniversary of 1956 cannot mend the 
damage caused by the “if you don’t talk about it, it does not exist” policy 
of communist brainwashing.  
Conclusions 
The above survey of 90 years of bilateral relations indicates that the 
two foreign services tend to look at the partner country through the prism 
of their own culture and expectations. Ever since 1848–49 Hungarians 
have expected some vaguely defined “fair play” from the United States 
and felt betrayed when American interests prompted a course other than 
the one they had counted on. Such unrealistic expectations manifested 
themselves as early as the immediate post-World War I period and 
continued to surface during the 1956 Revolution and in 2006. This 
expected American support never came, mostly because Hungary is 
viewed in Washington as an unimportant country and a possible source of 
trouble on account of Trianon and two world wars fought against one 
another. Since 1922 Washington has not felt the urge to understand 
Hungary; consequently, her decisions are defined not by any informed 
policy, but by improvisation on the basis of the input of special interest 
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groups or individuals. This is why American conduct sometimes appears 
condescending to Hungarians, which, in turn, feeds anti-American 
sentiments. Cultural studies calls this process “othering,” and it is on 
display in mutual stereotypes as much as in diplomatic conduct.  
Hungarians have always looked upon the New World as an 
economic and political promised land. Whereas the economic dimension 
has immense staying power, the political dimension, as I have explained 
elsewhere, never took root. Most Hungarians admire the American 
constitutional tradition and appreciate the democratic advances American 
society continues to make in terms of race and gender relations, but when 
the time for decision comes the American model is systematically 
ignored. Anti-Americanism first emerged in the 1890s, and became 
official government policy during the Cold War.
39
 Spontaneous anti-
Americanism appeared in the transition period after World War II and 
returned after the millennium. On both occasions, it was triggered by 
American political action, or lack thereof. 
Americans have always looked upon independent Hungary as an 
exotic country, and since World War I as a source of potential trouble. 
Trianon generated fears of political instability as American business 
interests were threatened, or believed to have been threatened, over and 
over again: after the Great War, in World War II, during communism, and 
more recently when Hungary chose Gripens over F-16 aircraft during the 
Clinton years. The cultural history of Hungary in the 20
th
 century shows 
that the State Department has not been able to capitalize on the 
surrealistically positive bias Hungarians have always had for the New 
World. For reasons outlined above, Hungarians traditionally go out of 
their way to accommodate expressed and presumed American 
expectations. Hungarian governments lent full diplomatic and military 
support to American war efforts in 1992 (the first Gulf War), 1999 
(bombing of Serbia), and more recently in Afghanistan. Most of the time, 
this takes place under a conservative government, but this is not reflected 
in American public diplomacy. It was the gap between American rhetoric 
and action that government-sponsored Cold War anti-Americanism was 
based upon, and it is responsible for rising anti-American sentiments 
today. 
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The balance sheet of 90 years of diplomatic relations clearly shows 
that political and economic diplomacy are not enough: they must be 
supplemented by active cultural diplomacy. Half a century of communist 
rule and brainwashing prevented the study, discussion, and dissemination 
of American culture, which cannot be made up for in a single generation. 
Hungarians are blatantly unaware of American history, not just our 
common past: there is no discussion of key historical events such as the 
Civil War or the War of 1812, and the various “history months” pass 
unnoticed over here. Consequently, American culture is misrepresented in 
the public discourse from gay rights through civil disobedience to checks 
and balances.
40
 Informed discussion is thus replaced by finger pointing: 
when Americans make a point, legitimate or not, about Hungarian 
domestic politics, the gut reaction is a reference to the fate of Native 
Americans, slavery, Hiroshima, or Guantanamo. American presidents 
routinely issue statements and proclamations on the major anniversaries 
of key Hungarian events but rarely go beyond that the way Theodore 
Roosevelt had done in the early 20
th
 century. Better cultural diplomacy 
and more genuine effort on both sides to understand the other are the keys 
to better relations in the new millennium. 
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